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Abstract
We present the intuitionistic version of PUC-Logic. After that, we present a constructive approach to Lewis’
counterfactual abstraction to show that it does not require the classical absurd rule.
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Introduction
In human speech, one may change his opinion about the truth of a given counterfactual sentence if his
knowledge about the subject grows. For example:
– (Pedro) I found Ana sad during the party.
– (Jonas) If her boyfriend had come to party, then Ana would have been happy during the party.
A day after this speech, Jonas discovered that Ana was sad during the party, because his boyfriend betrayed
her. So, he may think that his counterfactual sentence is no longer valid.
The intuitionistic approach is a traditional way to deal with knowledge growth. We discuss one alter-
native approach over the counterfactual logic to express this property of the human speech, presenting the
intuitionistic reformulation of the PUC-logic, called iPUC-Logic for short.
We avoid the repetition in this chapter of definitions and lemmas of PUC-Logic [16] that are the same
for iPUC-Logic.
Definition 1. Given a set of worlds W , a nested sets function $ over W and a truth evaluation function V
for each atomic formula, we define a relation of accessibility from a world u to a world v, denoted by u  v,
as a reflexive and transitive relation such that $(v) = $(u) and, if u ∈ V(α) and u v, then v ∈ V(α). Given
a world u, the set of worlds v, such that u  v, is denoted by A(u).
The restriction $(v) = $(u) means that the proximity notions are preserved by the accessible worlds.
This restriction was meant to preserve lemma 1. But since we are interested in knowledge growth, it is
not an artificial restriction. In the example above, the perception of Jonas about how things works did not
changed much from the additional knowledge. It means that, for him, the notions of similarity were just
the same as in the day before.
1Thanks to PUC-Rio for the VRac sponsor. Thanks to DAAD (Germany) for the Specialist Literature Programme.
Definition 2. Given a variable assignment function σ, the relation |= of satisfaction between wff, labels,
models and templates is given by:
2. 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= ¬ (αΣ) iff: ¬ (αΣ) ∈ F n and
∀λ ∈ A(χ) : 〈W , $,V , λ〉 6|= αΣ;
5. 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= αΣ → βΩ iff: αΣ → βΩ ∈ F n and
∀λ ∈ A(χ), if 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= αΣ, then 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= βΩ;
14. 〈W , $,V , χ,N〉 |= ¬ (αΣ) iff: ¬ (αΣ) ∈ Fw and ∀λ ∈ A(χ) : 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 6|= α
Σ;
17. 〈W , $,V , χ,N〉 |= αΣ → βΩ iff: αΣ → βΩ ∈ Fw and
∀λ ∈ A(χ): if 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= αΣ, then 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= βΩ.
The iPUC Natural Deduction System is obtained from the PUC-ND by removing the rule 7 (classical
absurd rule).
1. iPUC Soundness and Completeness
Lemma 1. Given ∆ without existential quantifiers, if (αΣ → βΩ)∆ is wff, then it implies αΣ,∆ → βΩ,∆.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the size of ∆:
If ∆ is empty, then the implication is true;
(base) If ∆ contains only one label, it must be a neighbourhood label:
- (αΣ → βΩ)⊛ means, by definition, that ∀N ∈ $(χ) : 〈W , $,V , χ,N〉 |= αΣ → βΩ. Then we know
that ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀λ ∈ A(χ) : if 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= αΣ, then 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= βΩ. Given an arbitrary
λ ∈ A(χ), if 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= αΣ,⊛, then ∀M ∈ $(λ) : 〈W , $,V , λ,M〉 |= αΣ. Since $(λ) = $(χ), by the
definition of the accessibility relation, we have ∀M ∈ $(χ) : 〈W , $,V , λ,M〉 |= αΣ. So, by a conclusion
above, we know that ∀M ∈ $(χ) : 〈W , $,V , λ,M〉 |= βΩ and ∀M ∈ $(λ) : 〈W , $,V , λ,M〉 |= βΩ, then
〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= βΩ,⊛. In other words, αΣ,⊛ → βΩ,⊛;
- (αΣ → βΩ)N means, by definition, that σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and 〈W , $,V , χ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ → βΩ. Then we
know that ∀λ ∈ A(χ) : if 〈W , $,V , λ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ, then 〈W , $,V , λ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ. Given an arbitrary
λ ∈ A(χ), if 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= αΣ,N , then σ(N) ∈ $(λ) and 〈W , $,V , λ, σ(N)〉 |= αΣ. Since $(λ) = $(χ),
we know that σ(N) ∈ $(χ) and by a conclusion above, we know that 〈W , $,V , λ, σ(N)〉 |= βΩ, so
〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= βΩ,N . In other words, αΣ,N → βΩ,N ;
(base) If ∆ contains two labels, it may be {⊛, ∗}, {N, ∗}, {⊛, u} or {N, u}. But we just need to look at the
distributivity for the ∗ label and for world variables, because we have already seen the distributivity of the
→ connective for the label ⊛ and for any neighbourhood variable.
- (αΣ → βΩ)∗,⊛ means, by definition, that ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : 〈W , $,V , w〉 |= αΣ → βΩ. Then we
know that ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : ∀λ ∈ A(w) : if 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= αΣ then 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= βΩ. Given an
arbitrary λ ∈ A(χ), if we have 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= αΣ,∗,⊛, then ∀M ∈ $(λ) : ∀z ∈ M : 〈W , $,V , z〉 |= αΣ.
Since $(λ) = $(χ), ∀M ∈ $(χ) : ∀z ∈ M : 〈W , $,V , z〉 |= αΣ. From z ∈ A(z) and a conclusion above,
we know that ∀M ∈ $(χ) : ∀z ∈ M : 〈W , $,V , z〉 |= βΩ and ∀M ∈ $(λ) : ∀z ∈ M : 〈W , $,V , z〉 |= βΩ,
so 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= βΩ,∗,⊛. It means that αΣ,∗,⊛ → βΩ,∗,⊛;
- The proofs of (αΣ → βΩ)∗,N , (αΣ → βΩ)u,⊛ and (αΣ → βΩ)u,N are analogous.
(induction) If αΣ → βΩ ∈ Fw and s(∆) = n + 1, then the scope must be a neighbourhood label and
αΣ,∆ → βΩ,∆ may be written as αΣ,φ,∆
′
→ βΩ,φ,∆
′
, where s(∆′) = n. Then, by the induction hypothesis,
αΣ,φ,∆
′
→ βΩ,φ,∆
′
= (αΣ,φ → βΩ,φ)∆
′
. From the base assertions, (αΣ,φ → βΩ,φ)∆
′
= ((αΣ → βΩ)φ)∆
′
=
(αΣ → βΩ)φ,∆
′
= (αΣ → βΩ)∆;
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(induction) If αΣ → βΩ ∈ F n and s(∆) = n + 2, then the scope must be a world label and α
Σ,∆ → βΩ,∆
may be written as αΣ,φ,Θ,∆
′
→ βΩ,φ,Θ,∆
′
, where s(∆′) = n. Then, by the induction hypothesis, αΣ,φ,Θ,∆
′
→
βΩ,φ,Θ,∆
′
= (αΣ,φ,Θ → βΩ,φ,Θ)∆
′
. By the base, (αΣ,φ,Θ → βΩ,φ,Θ)∆
′
= ((αΣ → βΩ)φ,Θ)∆
′
= (αΣ →
βΩ)φ,Θ,∆
′
= (αΣ → βΩ)∆.
Lemma 2. iPUC-ND without the rules 5, 11, 18, 20, 27, 28 and 29 preserves resolution.
Proof. Consider M = 〈W , $,V , χ〉. We present the proof for rule 12, because the proof for the other rules
are equal as in lemma 8 of [16].
(12) If M |=∆ αΣ → βΩ, then M |= (αΣ → βΩ)∆, then, by lemma 1, M |= αΣ,∆ → βΩ,∆. Then,
by definition, ∀λ ∈ A(χ) : if 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= αΣ,∆, then 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= βΩ,∆. Since χ ∈ A(χ), then, if
〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= αΣ,∆, then 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= βΩ,∆. But we already know that 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= αΣ,∆ and we can
conclude M |=∆ βΩ.
Lemma 3. If 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= αΣ, then ∀λ ∈ A(χ) : 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= αΣ
Proof. If 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= α, α atomic, then, by the definition of the accessibility relation, then ∀λ ∈ A(χ) :
〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= α. If 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= αΣ, Σ non empty, then ∀λ ∈ A(χ) : 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= αΣ because
∀λ ∈ A(χ) : $(χ) = $(λ). The systems of neighbourhoods being the same makes equal the evaluation of
the formula. So, if 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= αΣ, then ∀λ ∈ A(χ) : 〈W , $,V , λ〉 |= αΣ because the evaluation of all
subformulas of αΣ are the same at all worlds of A(χ), including χ itself.
Lemma 4. iPUC-ND preserves resolution.
Proof. During the proof M = 〈W , $,V , χ〉. We present the proof for each remaining rule of the iPUC-ND
inside an induction. Base argument:
5. If M |=∆ αΣ ∨ βΩ, then M |= (αΣ ∨ βΩ)∆, then, by lemma 5 of [16], M |= αΣ,∆ ∨ βΩ,∆, then, by
definition, M |= αΣ,∆ or M |= βΩ,∆. This means, by definition, that M |=∆ αΣ or M |=∆ βΩ. So, if
Π1 and Π2 only contains the rules from lemma 2,M |=
Θ γΛ in both cases, because of the preservation
of the resolution relation. And, for that conclusion, the hypothesis are no longer necessary and may
be discharged;
11. If Π only contains the rules of lemma 2, then, from the hypothesis that M |=∆ αΣ, the derivation
gives us M |=∆ βΩ. If βΩ ∈ F n, then, by the fitting relation and lemma 2 of [16], we know that s(∆)
is even. If we take some model H = 〈W , $,V , z〉, such that M⊸s(∆) H and H |= β
Ω, then, by lemma
3, ∀w ∈ A(z) : 〈W , $,V , w〉 |= βΩ and, by definition, H |= αΣ → βΩ. So, by definition, βΩ |=M:s(∆)
αΣ → βΩ, which means, by lemma 21 of [16], that M |=∆ αΣ → βΩ. If βΩ ∈ Fw, then, by the fitting
relation and lemma 2 of [16], we know that s(∆) is odd. If we take some template T = 〈W , $,V , z, L〉,
such that M ⊸s(∆) T and T |= β
Ω, then, by lemma 3, ∀w ∈ A(z) : 〈W , $,V , w, L〉 |= βΩ and, by
definition, T |= αΣ → βΩ. So, by definition, βΩ |=M:s(∆) α
Σ → βΩ, which means, by lemma 21 of
[16], that M |=∆ αΣ → βΩ. So the hypothesis is unnecessary and may be discharged;
18. IfM |=∆,• αΣ, then, by the rule 14,M |=∆ αΣ,•. From αΣ,• ∈ Fw, the fitting relation and lemma 2 of
[16], we know that s(∆) is odd. If we take some template T = 〈W , $,V , z,N〉, such that M⊸s(∆) T
and T |= αΣ,•, then, N ∈ $(z) and ∃w ∈ N : 〈W , $,V , w〉 |= αΣ. Since the variable u occurs nowhere
else in the derivation, u can be taken as a denotation of the given existential and we conclude that
〈W , $,V , u〉 |= αΣ, what means that T |= αΣ,u. So, by definition, αΣ,• |=M:s(∆) α
Σ,u, which means,
by lemma 21 of [16], that M |=∆ αΣ,u. We conclude, using the rule 13, that M |=∆,u αΣ. If Π only
contains rules of the lemma 2, then we can concludeM |=Θ βΩ. Then we can discharge the hypothesis
because we know that any denotation of the existential may provide the same conclusion;
20. If M |=∆,⊚ αΣ, then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ αΣ,⊚. From αΣ,⊚ ∈ F n, the fitting relation and lemma
2 of [16], we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W , $,V , z〉, such that M⊸s(∆) H
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and H |= αΣ,⊚, then ∃M ∈ $(z) : 〈W , $,V , z,M〉 |= αΣ. Since the variable N occurs nowhere
else in the derivation, N can be taken as a denotation of the given existential and we conclude that
〈W , $,V , z,N〉 |= αΣ, what means that H |= αΣ,N . So, by definition, αΣ,⊚ |=M:s(∆) α
Σ,N , which
means, by lemma 21 of [16], that M |=∆ αΣ,N . We conclude, using the rule 13, that M |=∆,N αΣ. If
Π only contains rules of the lemma 2, then we can conclude M |=Θ βΩ. Then we can discharge the
hypothesis because we know that any denotation of the existential may provide the same conclusion.
Inductive case: the same argument as in lemma 28 of [16].
Theorem 1. Γ ⊢ αΣ implies Γ |= αΣ (Soundness).
Proof. The fitting restriction of the rules of iPUC-ND ensures that αΣ has neighbourhood characteristic
because it appears in the empty context. The same conclusion follows for every formula of Γ. The derivability
assures that there is a derivation that concludes αΣ and takes as open hypothesis a subset of Γ, which we
call Γ′. If we take a model M that satisfies every formula of Γ, then it also satisfies every formula of Γ′. So,
M |= γΘ, for every γΘ ∈ Γ′. But this means, by definition, that for every wff of Γ′ the resolution relation
holds with the empty context. Then, from lemma 4, we know that M |= αΣ. So, every model that satisfies
every formula of Γ also satisfies αΣ and, by definition, Γ |= αΣ.
We use prime theories to prove completeness. The reader can see the intuitionistic logic case of this way
of proving completeness in [20]. We recall from [16] the following definitions:
Definition 3. Given αΣ ∈ F n, if α
Σ has no variables in the attributes of its subformulas nor any subformula
of the shape ˆN or ´N , then αΣ ∈ Sn. By analogy, we can construct Sw from Fw.
Definition 4. Given Γ ⊂ Sn (Γ ⊂ Sw), we say that Γ is n-inconsistent (w-inconsistent) if Γ ⊢ ⊥n (Γ ⊢
N
N
⊥w, where N is a neighbourhood variable that does not occur in Γ) and n-consistent (w-consistent) if Γ 6⊢ ⊥n
(Γ 6⊢NN ⊥w).
Lemma 5. Given Γ ⊂ Sn (Γ ⊂ Sw), if there is a model (template) that satisfies every formula of Γ, then
Γ is n-consistent.
Proof. This proof is analogous to the classical case, with the addition that here we use theorem 1 instead
of theorem 31 of [16].
Lemma 6. Given Γ ⊂ Sn (Γ ⊂ Sw), if Γ ∪ {φ
Θ} ⊢ ⊥n, then Γ ⊢ ¬φ
Θ.
Proof. The assumption implies that there is a derivation D with with hypothesis in Γ∪{φΘ} and conclusion
⊥n. If we apply the rule →-introduction and eliminate all occurrences of φ
Θ as hypothesis, then we obtain
a derivation with hypothesis in Γ and conclusion ¬φΘ. The same argument holds for Γ ⊂ Sw.
Definition 5. Γ ⊂ Sn (Γ ⊂ Sw) is a prime n-theory (prime w-theory) iff (i) Γ ⊢ α
Σ (Γ ⊢NN α
Σ) implies
αΣ ∈ Γ and (ii) if αΣ ∨ βΩ ∈ Γ implies αΣ ∈ Γ or βΩ ∈ Γ.
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Lemma 7. Given Γ ∪ {αΣ} ⊂ Sn (Γ ∪ {α
Σ} ⊂ Sw), if Γ 6⊢ α
Σ (Γ 6⊢NN α
Σ), then there is a prime n-theory
(w-theory) Γ′, such that Γ ⊂ Γ′ and Γ′ 6⊢ αΣ.
Proof. According to lemma 37 of [16], we may have a list ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . of all wff in Sn. We build a non-
decreasing sequence of sets Γi such that the union is a prime theory. We put Γ0 = Γ. Then we take the
first disjunctive sentence that has not been treated and Γn ⊢ ϕ0 ∨ϕ1: Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {ϕ0} if Γn ∪ {ϕ0} 6⊢ α
Σ,
Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {ϕ1} otherwise. It cannot be the case that Γn ∪ {ϕ0} ⊢ α
Σ and Γn ∪ {ϕ1} ⊢ α
Σ, because, in
this case, Γn ⊢ α
Σ by ∨-elimination. So, Γ′ =
⋃
{Γn | n ≥ 0}.
(a) Γ′ 6⊢ αΣ: by induction, since Γ0 6⊢ α
Σ and Γn+1 6⊢ α
Σ by the definition of the induction step. (b) Γ′ is a
prime theory: (i) if ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ Γ
′, then take the least number k such that Γk ⊢ ψ1 ∨ ψ2. So, ψ1 ∨ ψ2 cannot
have been treated at a stage before k and Γh ⊢ ψ1 ∨ ψ2, for h ≥ k. At some point ψ1 ∨ ψ2 must be treated
at a stage h ≥ k. Then, ψ1 ∈ Γh+1 or ψ2 ∈ Γh+1 and, by definition, ψ1 ∈ Γ
′ or ψ2 ∈ Γ
′. (ii) if Γ′ ⊢ ψ, then
Γ′ ⊢ ψ ∨ ψ, then by (i) ψ ∈ Γ′.
The same argument holds for sentences in Sw.
Definition 6. Given a prime n-theory Γ and a prime w-theory Λ, we say that Γ accepts Λ (Γ ∝ Λ) if
αΣ ∈ Λ implies αΣ,⊚ ∈ Γ. If αΣ ∈ Γ implies αΣ,• ∈ Λ, then Λ ∝ Γ.
Definition 7. Given prime w-theories Γ and Λ, we say that Γ subordinates Λ (Λ ⊏ Γ) iff αΣ,• ∈ Λ implies
αΣ,• ∈ Γ and αΣ,∗ ∈ Γ implies αΣ,∗ ∈ Λ.
Lemma 8. If Γ ⊂ Sn is n-consistent, then there is a model M, such that M |= α
Σ, for every αΣ ∈ Γ.
Proof. By definition, Γ 6⊢ ⊥n and, by lemma 7, Γ is contained in a prime n-theory Γ
′, such that Γ′ 6⊢ ⊥n. We
take every prime n-theory Ψ as a representation of one world of W , denoted by χΨ. Every prime w-theory
will be seen as a set of worlds that may be a neighbourhood. We take ∝ as the nested neighbourhood
function $ and ⊏ as the total order among neighbourhoods. We take the subset relation among prime
n-theories as the accessibility relation among worlds. To build the truth evaluation function V , we require,
for every prime n-theory Ψ and for every α atomic: (a) χΨ ∈ V(α) if α ∈ Ψ; (b) χΨ 6∈ V(α) if α 6∈ Ψ. If we
take M = 〈W , $,V , χΓ′〉, then, for every wff α
Σ ∈ Γ′, M |= αΣ. We proceed by induction on the structure
of αΣ:
(Base) If αΣ is atomic, M |= αΣ iff αΣ ∈ Γ′, by the definition of V ;
αΣ = βΩ ∧ γΘ. M |= αΣ iff M |= βΩ and M |= γΘ iff (induction hypothesis) βΩ ∈ Γ′ and γΘ ∈ Γ′. We
conclude that αΣ ∈ Γˆ by a single application of the ∧-introduction rule and the fact that a prime theory
is closed by derivability. Conversely αΣ ∈ Γ′ iff βΩ ∈ Γ′ and γΘ ∈ Γ′ by ∧-elimination and the fact that a
prime theory is closed by derivability. The rest follows by the induction hypothesis;
αΣ = βΩ ∨ γΘ. By the definition of prime theory, βΩ ∈ Γ′ or γΘ ∈ Γ′ and we proceed by induction.
αΣ = βΩ → γΘ. M 6|= αΣ iff ∃χΨ ∈ A(χΓ′ ) such that 〈W , $,V , χΨ〉 |= β
Ω and 〈W , $,V , χΨ〉 6|= γ
Θ iff
(induction hypothesis) βΩ ∈ Ψ and γΘ 6∈ Ψ. So, by the fact that a prime theory is closed by derivability
and by →-elimination, we conclude that βΩ → γΘ 6∈ Ψ. By the definition of accessibility among worlds,
Γ′ ⊂ Ψ and βΩ → γΘ 6∈ Γ′. Conversely, βΩ → γΘ 6∈ Γ′ implies that, if βΩ ∈ Γ′, then γΘ 6∈ Γ′, because, on
the contrary, for every prime n-theory Ψ, such that Γ′ ⊂ Ψ, γΘ ∈ Ψ and by i.h. 〈W , $,V , χΨ〉 |= γ
Θ. So,
by the definition of accessibility of worlds, for every χΨ ∈ A(χΓ′) : 〈W , $,V , χΨ〉 |= γ
Θ and, by definition,
M |= βΩ → γΘ. From βΩ ∈ Γ′ we know that by i.h. M |= βΩ. So, from χΓ′ ∈ A(χΓ′) and M |= β
Ω → γΘ,
we get M |= γΘ and by i.h. γΘ ∈ Γ′. But, in this case, βΩ → γΘ ∈ Γ′ by a single →introduction and the
fact that a prime theory is closed by derivability;
αΣ = ¬βΩ. This case is treated by the previous case, because ¬βΩ ≡ βΩ → ⊥n;
αΣ = βΩ,⊛. This wff do not require the existence of a prime w-theory to represent a neighbourhood in
which βΩ holds, on the contrary, it only requires that there is no prime w-theory, accepted by Υ, in which
γΘ does not hold.
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αΣ = βΩ,⊚. We take any enumeration ρ1, ρ2, . . . in Fw, such that ρ
⊚
i ∈ Γ
′ and ρ0 = β
Ω. We construct a
w-theory by following:
• Υ0 = {β
Ω};
• Υi = Υi−1 ∪ {ρi}, if (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ρi)
⊚ ∈ Γ′, where Υi−1 = {ϕ0, . . . , ϕm}. Υi = Υi−1 otherwise;
• Υ =
⋃
n∈NΥn.
Now we must prove the following:
1. Υ is a w-theory:
• Υ 6⊢ ⊥w. A derivation in iPUC build only with wff from Fw must have all rules with odd sized
context. To do so, we choose a neighbourhood variable, that do not occur during the derivation,
to be the leftmost label at every context that appears during the derivation. This new variable
may be understood as the representation of the neighbourhood in which the inference is made.
So, if Υ is not w-consistent, then, given some derivation D that concludes ⊥w from wff of Υ,
there is an index n ∈ N, such that Υn contains all wff that appears in D. So, by definition, that
there is a wff (ϕ0 ∧ . . .∧ϕm)
⊚ ∈ Γ′, such that ϕ0, . . . , ϕm represent all wff of Υn and ⊥n ∈ Γ
′ by
the derivation below, which is a contradiction by the definition of Γ′.
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm)
⊚
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm)
⊚
⊚
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm
[ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm]
N
D′
N
⊥w
⊥n
⊥n
The derivation D′ is obtained from D by 1) adding ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm in the place of the hypothesis
ϕi and the following ∧-eliminations to recover ϕi; 2) binding the variable N added to produce D.
• If ̟ ∨ ϑ ∈ Υ, then ∃i ∈ N : ρi = ̟ ∨ ϑ ∈ Υi and (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ (̟ ∨ ϑ))
⊚ ∈ Γ′. By the
distribution of ∨ over ∧, we know that ((ϕ0 ∧ . . .∧ϕm ∧̟)∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . .∧ϕm ∧ ϑ))
⊚ ∈ Γ′. By the
following derivation (Π1), we know that (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ and,
by the definition of prime theory, (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ or (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
⊚ ∈ Γ′. We
proceed now considering the possibilities of the order provided by the enumeration ρ. Without
loss of generality, we suppose that ρk = ̟, ρl = ϑ and k < l. In the case l < i, we are done,
because, from (ϕ0 ∧ . . .∧ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ or (ϕ0 ∧ . . .∧ϕm ∧ϑ)
⊚ ∈ Γ′, we can eliminate the extra
formulas to recover Υk or Υl by the rule of construction of the set Υ. In the case i < m, at the
moment of verification of ρm, we know that for all formulas of Υm−1 = {ϕ0, . . . , (̟ ∨ ϑ), . . . , ϕt}
we have a conjunction (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ (̟ ∨ ϑ) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕt)
⊚ ∈ Γ′. By a derivation similar to Π1, we
know that (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ̟ ∧ . . . ∧ ϕt)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ or (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϑ ∧ . . . ∧ ϕt)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ and by means of a
∨-introduction in another derivation we know that (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ (̟ ∨ ϑ) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕt ∧̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ or
(ϕ0∧. . .∧(̟∨ϑ)∧. . .∧ϕt∧ϑ)
⊚ ∈ Γ′. If we have (ϕ0∧. . .∧(̟∨ϑ)∧. . .∧ϕt∧̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′, then Υm and
Υ contain ̟. If we have (ϕ0∧ . . .∧(̟∨ϑ)∧ . . .∧ϕt∧ϑ)
⊚ ∈ Γ′, at the moment of verification of ρl,
we make the distribution of the disjunction (̟∨ϑ) again. Given Υl−1 = {ϕ0, . . . , (̟∨ϑ), . . . , ϕs}
we have a conjunction (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ (̟ ∨ ϑ) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕs)
⊚ ∈ Γ′. By a derivation similar to Π1, we
know that (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧̟ ∧ . . . ∧ ϕs)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ or (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϑ ∧ . . . ∧ ϕs)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ and by means of a
∨-introduction in another derivation we know that (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ (̟ ∨ ϑ) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕs ∧ ̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ or
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ (̟ ∨ ϑ) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕs ∧ ϑ)
⊚ ∈ Γ′. If (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ (̟ ∨ ϑ) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕs ∧ ϑ)
⊚ ∈ Γ′, then we
are done. If (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ (̟ ∨ ϑ) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕs ∧̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′, then we have a contradiction, because we
supposed that (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ (̟ ∨ ϑ) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕt ∧̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ were not the case and we can recover it
by eliminating the extra formulas. The the case m < i < l is analogous.
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((ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟) ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ))
⊚
((ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟) ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ))
⊚
⊚
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟) ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟) ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
N
Π2
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
⊚
Π1
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
⊚
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟) ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
N
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟) ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
[ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟]
Nϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟
Π3
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
⊚
[ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ]
N
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ
Π4
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
⊚
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
⊚
Π2
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
⊚
((ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟) ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ))
⊚
((ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟) ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ))
⊚
⊚
((ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟) ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ))
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟
Nϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟
⊚
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚
Π3
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∨ (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ϑ)
⊚
Π4 is analogous.
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• Υ is closed by derivation. Given a derivation D of wff in Fw that concludes ̟ and that has a new
neighbourhood variable N like described above. Then there is i ∈ N, such that Υi = {ϕ0, . . . , ϕm}
contains all hypothesis in D. It means that (ϕ0∧ . . .∧ϕm)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ and, by the following derivation,
we know that (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′ because Γ′ is a prime theory. If ρk = ̟ and k ≤ i,
then ̟ ∈ Υ, because we can obtain (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕj ∧ ̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′, where Υk−1 = {ϕ0, . . . , ϕj}, by
eliminating the extra formulas. If k > i, then, from (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕj)
⊚, we can obtain, by a similar
derivation, (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕj ∧̟)
⊚ because all the wff of Υi are in Υk.
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm)⊚
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm)⊚
⊚
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm)⊚
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm)⊚
⊚
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm
[ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm]
N
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm
[ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm]
N
D
′
N̟
N
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟
⊚
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟
⊚
ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟
(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)⊚
The derivation D′ is obtained from D by 1) adding ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm in the place of the hypothesis
ϕi and the following ∧-eliminations to recover ϕi; 2) binding the variable N added to D.
2. Υ is accepted by Γ′: for every wff ̟ ∈ Υ, there is i ∈ N, such that ̟ ∈ Υi, what means that there
is a conjunction such that (ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧̟)
⊚ ∈ Γ′. We obtain ̟⊚ ∈ Γ′ by a derivation with some
∧-eliminations.
3. The wff of the form γΘ,• ∈ Υ demand a prime n-theory to represent a world in which γΘ holds. The
argument is, like in the classical situation, analogous to the case of the wff βΩ,⊚ ∈ Γ′.
4. The wff of the form γΘ,∗ ∈ Υ do not require the existence of a prime n-theory to represent a world in
which γΘ holds, on the contrary, it only requires that there is no prime n-theory, accepted by Υ, in
which γΘ does not hold.
Corollary 1. Γ 6⊢ αΣ iff there is a model M, such that M |= φΘ, for every φΘ ∈ Γ, and M 6|= αΣ.
Proof. Γ 6⊢ αΣ iff Γ∪ {¬αΣ} is n-consistent by lemma 6 and the definition of n-consistent set. By lemmas 5
and 8, Γ ∪ {¬αΣ} is n-consistent iff there is a model M, such that M |= φΘ, for every φΘ ∈ Γ ∪ {¬αΣ}. It
means that M satisfies every formula of Γ and M 6|= αΣ.
Theorem 2. Γ |= αΣ implies Γ ⊢ αΣ (Completeness).
Proof. Γ 6⊢ αΣ implies Γ 6|= αΣ, by the corollary 1 and the definition of logical consequence.
Theorem 3. Every derivation of iPUC-Logic is normalizable.
Proof. To the PUC normalization arguments we add some permutation reductions following the approach
of van Dalen [20] for the operators not in L−.
The arguments about decidability and complexity of iPUC are analogous to PUC and produce analogous
results.
Theorem 4. The problem of satisfiability is PS-complete for iPUC-Logic.
Proof. We repeat the arguments for theorem 57 of [16], but with reference to the article of Statman[25].
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2. Constructive Counterfactuals
In the proof of the relative completeness of PUC-Logic for the Lewis V-Logic, the proofs of CONNEX
and CPR demanded the classical absurd rule. In order to do provide a constructive approach over the
counterfactual logic, we need to find another way to prove them. Lewis [1] gave us (page 124) an alternative
formulation for the CPR rule with a simpler rule and an axiom schema:
φ→ ψ
ψ 4 φ
and (φ 4 (φ ∨ ψ)) ∨ (ψ 4 (φ ∨ ψ))
That rule is a derived rule in iPUC as we can see by the derivation below, using lemma 59 of [16] (proof Π):
1[φ•]
N
φ•
N, •
φ
2[φ]
N, u
φ
Π
N, u
φ→ ψ
N, u
ψ
N, u
ψ
N, •
ψ
N
ψ•
N
ψ•
1 N
φ• → ψ•
⊛
φ• → ψ•
(φ• → ψ•)⊛
Inside iPUC-Logic, the axioms (φ 4 (φ∨ψ))∨ (ψ 4 (φ∨ψ)) are unnecessary to recover the completeness
of the V-Logic, because they are derived formulas in the presence of CONNEX:
(φ• → ψ•)⊛ ∨ (ψ• → φ•)⊛
(φ• → ψ•)⊛ ∨ (ψ• → φ•)⊛
3[(φ• → ψ•)⊛]
(φ• → ψ•)⊛
⊛
φ• → ψ•
1[φ•]
⊛
φ•
ψ•
⊛, •
ψ
⊛, •
φ ∨ ψ
⊛
(φ ∨ ψ)•
1 ⊛
φ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•
((φ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•)⊛
((φ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•)⊛ ∨ ((ψ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•)⊛
3[(ψ• → φ•)⊛]
(ψ• → φ•)⊛
⊛
ψ• → φ•
2[ψ•]
⊛
ψ•
φ•
⊛, •
φ
⊛, •
φ ∨ ψ
⊛
(φ ∨ ψ)•
2 ⊛
ψ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•
((ψ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•)⊛
((φ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•)⊛ ∨ ((ψ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•)⊛
3
((φ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•)⊛ ∨ ((ψ• → (φ ∨ ψ)•)⊛
So, in order to recover the full V-Logic expressivity, we need to introduce some rules into the iPUC-Logic.
The first approach is a rule, motivated by [15], with two restrictions: (a) the formulas fit into their contexts;
(b) ∆ has no universal quantifier. And the CONNEX axioms became theorems:
[αΣ,• → βΩ,•]
∆,⊛
Π1
Θ
γΛ
[βΩ,• → αΣ,•]
∆,⊛
Π2
Θ
γΛ
31: Θ
γΛ
[αΣ,• → βΩ,•]
⊛
αΣ,• → βΩ,•
(αΣ,• → βΩ,•)⊛
(αΣ,• → βΩ,•)⊛ ∨ (βΩ,• → αΣ,•)⊛
[βΩ,• → αΣ,•]
⊛
βΩ,• → αΣ,•
(βΩ,• → αΣ,•)⊛
(αΣ,• → βΩ,•)⊛ ∨ (βΩ,• → αΣ,•)⊛
(αΣ,• → βΩ,•)⊛ ∨ (βΩ,• → αΣ,•)⊛
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Definition 8. Given any modelM = 〈W , $,V , χ〉, the set of testimonials of αΣ is the set of neighbourhoods
T (αΣ) = {N ∈ $(χ) | 〈W , $,V , χ,N〉 |= αΣ,•} and the set of believers of αΣ is the set of neighbourhoods
B(αΣ) = {N ∈ $(χ) | 〈W , $,V , χ,N〉 |= αΣ,∗}.
T (αΣ) is an hereditary set [6] in $(χ), because given any neighbourhoodM ∈ T , for every L ∈ $(χ), such
that M ⊂ L, then 〈W , $,V , χ, L〉 |= ˆM and, by world existential propagation, 〈W , $,V , χ, L〉 |= αΣ,• and
L ∈ T . But the hereditary sets are in total order in $(χ), so, given any set T (βΩ), either T (αΣ) ⊂ T (βΩ)
or T (βΩ) ⊂ T (αΣ). In the case where T (αΣ) ⊂ T (βΩ), we know that every neighbourhood, that has a
αΣ-world, must have a βΩ-world and we conclude that M |= (αΣ,• → βΩ,•)⊛. By analogy, in the other case
M |= (βΩ,• → αΣ,•)⊛. So, by definition, M |= (αΣ,• → βΩ,•)⊛ ∨ (βΩ,• → αΣ,•)⊛ and the rule 31 is sound.
We can see that the soundness of rule 31 relies upon the hereditary sets definition. But the rule depends
on the index of two formulas, the operator → and the scope of the rule and it makes this rule two much
complex. So, instead of adding rule 31 into iPUC-Logic, we prefer to add the representation of the hereditary
sets into the system. We can also treat the hereditary sets of believers to recover some symmetry between
the world quantifiers, because we have, by a similar argument, M |= (αΣ,∗ → βΩ,∗)⊛ ∨ (βΩ,∗ → αΣ,∗)⊛.
This extension of iPUC will be called iPUCV -Logic.
32: ∆, T (αΣ)
αΣ,•
∆, T (βΩ)
αΣ
33: ∆,⊛
βΩ,• → αΣ
∆,⊛
βΩ,• → αΣ
34: ∆, T (βΩ)
αΣ
[αΣ,•]
∆, T (βΩ)
Π1
Θ
γΨ
[βΩ,•]
∆, T (αΣ)
Π2
Θ
γΨ
35: Θ
γΨ
36: ∆,B(αΣ)
αΣ,∗
∆,B(βΩ)
αΣ
37: ∆,⊛
βΩ,∗ → αΣ
∆,⊛
βΩ,∗ → αΣ
38: ∆,B(βΩ)
αΣ
[αΣ,∗]
∆,B(βΩ)
Π1
Θ
γΨ
[βΩ,∗]
∆,B(αΣ)
Π2
Θ
γΨ
39: Θ
γΨ
Figure 1: The additional rules of iPUCV -ND
Restriction for rules from 32 to 39: All formulas must fit into their contexts. Restriction for the rules 32
and 39: ∆ has no universal quantifier.
Lemma 9. iPUCV is sound.
Proof. First of all, we need to add T and B as labels. Those sets may be empty and may be defined by an
universal quantification. For example, T (αΣ) may be defined by the sentence: for all N ∈ $(χ), such that
αΣ holds in some of its worlds. So, we consider T and B as restrictions of the label ⊛, thus as universal
quantifiers over neighbourhoods. For the semantics:
19. 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= βΩ,T (α
Σ) iff: αΣ ∈ F n, β
Ω ∈ Fw and ∀λ ∈ A(χ), ∀N ∈ $(λ) : if 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= α
Σ,•,
then 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= βΩ;
20. 〈W , $,V , χ〉 |= βΩ,B(α
Σ) iff: αΣ ∈ F n, β
Ω ∈ Fw and ∀λ ∈ A(χ), ∀N ∈ $(λ) : if 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= α
Σ,∗,
then 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= βΩ.
For the definition of the previous rules, we only need to change the first restriction of the rule 9: (a) ∆ must
have no occurrence of universal quantifiers over neighbourhoods. For the proof of the lemmas and theorems
for soundness and completeness, the arguments for T and B should follow the arguments for ⊛.
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To prove that iPUCV is sound, we follow the strategy for PUC and iPUC. So, we need to prove that the
additional rules preserve resolution.
32. From the fitting relation and lemma 2 of [16], s({∆, T (αΣ}) must be odd, because αΣ,• ∈ Fw. So,
s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W , $,V , z〉, such that M ⊸s(∆) H, then we know, by
definition, that ∀λ ∈ A(χ), ∀N ∈ $(λ) : if 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= αΣ,•, then 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= αΣ, which
means that M |=∆ αΣ,•,T (α
Σ) and, by rule 13, M |=∆,T (α
Σ) αΣ,•;
33. If M |=∆,T (β
Ω) αΣ, then, by the rule 14, M |=∆ αΣ,T (β
Ω). From αΣ,T (β
Ω) ∈ F n, the fitting relation
and lemma 2 of [16], we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some model H = 〈W , $,V , z〉, such
that M ⊸s(∆) H and H |= α
Σ,T (βΩ), then ∀λ ∈ A(z), ∀N ∈ $(λ) : if 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= βΩ,•, then
〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= αΣ. By definition ∀λ ∈ A(z) : $(λ) = $(z), then we know that ∀N ∈ $(z) : ∀λ ∈
A(z), if 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= βΩ,•, then 〈W , $,V , λ,N〉 |= αΣ, what means that ∀N ∈ $(z) : βΩ,• → αΣ.
We conclude that H |= (βΩ,• → αΣ)⊛ and, by definition, αΣ,T (β
Ω) |=M:s(∆) (β
Ω,• → αΣ)⊛, which
means, by lemma 21 of [16], that M |=∆ (βΩ,• → αΣ)⊛ and, by rule 13, M |=∆,⊛ βΩ,• → αΣ;
34. Analogous to the rule 33, but in the reverse order of the conclusions;
35. From rule 14, the fitting relation, and lemma 2 of [16], we know that s(∆) is even. If we take some
model H = 〈W , $,V , z〉, such that M ⊸s(∆) H, we know that T (α
Σ) ⊂ T (βΩ) or T (βΩ) ⊂ T (αΣ).
This means that ∀N ∈ $(z) : if 〈W , $,V , z,N〉 |= αΣ,• then 〈W , $,V , z,N〉 |= βΩ,• or ∀N ∈ $(z) : if
〈W , $,V , z,N〉 |= βΩ,• then 〈W , $,V , z,N〉 |= αΣ,•. We can expressed it byH |= αΣ,•,T (β
Ω)∨βΩ,•,T (α
Σ),
because ∀λ ∈ A(z) : $(λ) = $(z). By definition, H |= αΣ,•,T (β
Ω) orH |= βΩ,•,T (α
Σ), then, by definition,
M |=∆ αΣ,•,T (β
Ω) or M |=∆ βΩ,•,T (α
Σ) and, using rule 13, M |=∆,T (β
Ω) αΣ,• or M |=∆,T (α
Σ) βΩ,•.
Using the same argument for the subderivations Π1 and Π2 as in lemma 28 of [16], then M |=
Θ γΨ
and the hypothesis may be discharged;
36. Analogous to the case of rule 32;
37. Analogous to the case of rule 33;
38. Analogous to the rule 37, but in the reverse order of the conclusions;
39. Analogous to the case of rule 35.
Lemma 10. iPUCV is normalizing.
Proof. We consider only the additional rules in this proof. The rules 32 and 36 introduce no maximum
formula and no detour, because they take no hypothesis. The rules 35 and 39 introduce no maximum
formula and no detour, because they do not change the formulas and because they left no open hypothesis
to produce a detour. The rules 33 and 34 can only produce a maximum formula if the conclusion of the rule
33 is taken as hypothesis of the rule 34. This situation can also be seen as a detour and is easily removed
by the following reduction rule:
∆, T (βΩ)
αΣ,•
33: ∆,⊛
βΩ,• → αΣ,•
34: ∆, T (βΩ)
αΣ,•
Π
✄
∆, T (βΩ)
αΣ,•
Π
The case of rules 37 and 38 is similar to the case of rules 33 and 34.
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Lemma 11. iPUCV is complete for V -Logic.
Proof.
1[α•]
T (β)
α•
⊛
β• → α•
(β• → α•)⊛
(α• → β•)⊛ ∨ (β• → α•)⊛
1[β•]
T (α)
β•
⊛
α• → β•
(α• → β•)⊛
(α• → β•)⊛ ∨ (β• → α•)⊛
1
(α• → β•)⊛ ∨ (β• → α•)⊛
By the beginning of this section, we only needed to prove that the CONNEX axioms are theorems.
Conclusions
The intuitionistic approach have shown the necessity to introduce a representation of the relation of total
order among neighbourhoods. And the total order is a core concept in Lewis work for counterfactual logic
and deontic logic because of the role of the nesting function in his arguments. The possibility of expressing
the total order in iPUCV may contribute to a deeper comprehension of Lewis arguments.
The possibility of a constructive approach over Lewis counterfactuals may also open some philosophical
questions for a further research.
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